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Abstract
The disposition effect is the observation that investors hold win-
ning stocks too long and sell losing stocks too early. A standard expla-
nation of the disposition effect refers to prospect theory and in partic-
ular to the asymmetric risk aversion according to which investors are
risk averse when faced with gains and risk-seeking when faced with
losses. We show that for reasonable parameter values the disposition
effect can however not be explained by prospect theory as proposed
by Kahneman and Tversky. The reason is that those investors who
sell winning stocks and hold loosing assets would in the first place not
have invested in stocks. That is to say the standard prospect theory
argument is sound ex-post, assuming that the investment has taken
place, but not ex-ante, requiring that the investment is made in the
first place.
Keywords: Disposition effect, prospect theory, portfolio choice
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1 Introduction
The disposition effect is the observation that investors tend to sell win-
ning stocks while they have a disposition to keep losing stocks. This obser-
vation has been made by a series of papers, including Shefrin and Statman
(1985), Odean (1998), Weber and Camerer (1998), Heath, Huddart, and Lang
(1999), Locke and Mann (2001), Grinblatt and Keloharju (2000), Grinblatt
and Keloharju (2001) and Ranguelova (2002). Of course, selling winners and
keeping losers as such is perfectly compatible with complete rationality. A
well known result is that an expected utility maximizer, with constant rela-
tive risk aversion, would rebalance a fixed-mix portfolio strategy in a setting
where the investment opportunity set is constant.1 Hence when prices rise
(fall) he would sell (buy) the security. However, as Odean (1998) has shown
investors are reluctant to sell losers even when controlling for rebalancing.
Hence the disposition effect is the observation that investors show a more ag-
gressive contrarian behavior than following the fixed-mix rule. As compared
to the fixed-mix case, investors prone to the disposition effect hold winners
too long and sell losers too early.
The disposition effect could result from a strong believe in mean-reversion
of the asset returns. Following this argument the disposition effect would then
stem from a misperception of the return process. An alternative behavioral
finance explanation of the disposition effect refers to prospect theory and
in particular to the asymmetric risk aversion. Under prospect theory, see
Kahneman and Tversky (1979), investors evaluate outcomes relative to a
reference point which in the case of stock investments is typically the price
at which the stock was bought. The reference point divides outcomes into
two regions: losses occur if the final wealth is below the reference point and
gains occur if the final wealth is above the reference point.
In the behavioral finance literature the disposition effect is explained by
two main features of prospect theory. First, decision-makers frame their
choices in terms of potential gains and losses. Second, they behave as if
evaluating the decision consequences on an S-shaped value function, which is
concave for gains and convex for losses. This reflects risk aversion in the gain
region and risk-seeking in the loss region. The disposition effect is seen as
an important implication of extending the prospect theory of Kahneman and
1See Samuelson (1969) and Merton (1969).
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Tversky (1979) and Tversky and Kahneman (1992) to investment decisions
and securities trading. The standard behavioral finance argument for the
disposition effect is that a gain (loss) moves the investor to his risk averse
(seeking) part of the value function so that he is leaned to reduce (increase)
his position in the risky assets; or stated differently, he sells winners and
holds losers.
However, in this standard argument, it is generally assumed that the
investor has bought the risky stock and thus the issue whether the investor
really will decide in this way is neglected. Hence this standard argument
is in fact an ex-post argument that corresponds to a liquidation situation
as analyzed by Kyle, Ou-Yang, and Xiong (1979). Similarly, Gomes (2005)
analyzes the comparative statics of a one period portfolio decision. Berkelaar,
Kouwenberg, and Post (2004) consider the dynamically optimal portfolio
allocation of a loss averse agent investing in continuous time. They focus on
the time diversification due to a change in the investment horizon. Our paper
is in between these two approaches since we consider a repeated portfolio
choice not requiring intertemporal optimization.
In our paper we consider a model with two consecutive portfolio choices in
a stylized financial market where the investor’s preferences are described by
prospect theory as suggested by Kahneman and Tversky (1979) and Tversky
and Kahneman (1992). We investigate the investor’s risk-taking behavior
following a rise, respectively a fall, in the price of the risky asset. In our
analysis we use a more complete definition of the disposition behavior, i.e.
besides requiring investors to sell winners and to hold losers, we require them
explicitly to buy the stock in the first period.
In our framework, there is a financial market on which two assets are
traded. A riskless asset, also called the bond, and a risky asset, the stock.
The evolution of the stock prices is described by a binomial process. The
preferences of the investor are based on changes in wealth and described
by prospect theory. We assume that he owns an initial endowment and
that he earns no other income. Since we want to model a small individual
investor, we assume that no short selling is allowed. Further we assume that
the investor acts myopically, in the sense that when taking his first decision
he does not already anticipate his optimal second period decision, and that
the reference point relative to which he measures his gains and losses is his
initial wealth. The assumption of myopic behavior is also justified by the
fact that we present a descriptive model for a small individual investor. Note
that requiring dynamic optimization, i.e. integrating into today’s decision
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the correctly anticipated optimal future decisions, seems to be at odds with
assuming reference point based behavior on the other hand. The investor
would then be very rational and very behavioral at the same time. The
investor’s portfolio decision consists of allocating his wealth to the two assets
traded in the financial market. For simplicity we restrict the fraction of
wealth invested in the risky asset to be either zero or one, i.e. the agent
chooses to invest fully or not to invest at all in the risky asset. Hence as soon
as the stock appreciates this is seen as a gain. Moreover, earning the risk-free
rate amounts to a gain and losses can only occur if the investor invests in
stocks.
Our first point of interest is the second period behavior of the investor
conditional on the stock price movement in the first period. In particular, we
ask whether we can explain the behavior of an investor prone to the ex-post
disposition effect. Assuming that the investor bought the stock in the first
period, we call him a disposition investor if he sells the risky asset after a gain
and keeps holding it after a loss2. We show how important aspects of prospect
theory, in particular loss aversion and probability weighting, interact with
asymmetric risk aversion. This analysis is of interest in itself but it also will
lay the foundations for the inter-temporal argument. In the inter-temporal
view we investigate the agent’s behavior with a focus on the more complete
definition of the disposition behavior. We show interactions between loss
aversion, decision weighting and asymmetric risk-taking.
Our findings are that the inter-temporal disposition effect arises rather for
lower coefficients of loss aversion and that whenever the agent can undo the
first period loss by investing in the risky asset the same is true for the ex-post
disposition effect. In the opposite case, the ex-post disposition effect arises
rather for more loss averse investors. Furthermore investors are generally
prone to the ex-post disposition effect, but hardly to the true disposition
effect. The reason is that those investors who sell winning stocks too early
and keep losing stocks too long would in the first place not have invested
in stocks. So even when considering explicitly the asymmetric risk-taking
behavior of the investor, a standard explication for the disposition behavior,
investors are not prone to the disposition effect. We conclude that prospect
theory can indeed explain the ex-post disposition behavior, but not the more
2The opposite behavior to the disposition effect is the house money effect found by
Thaler and Johnson (1990) according to which the investor sells the risky asset after a loss
and keeps holding it after a gain.
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complete inter-temporal definition of the disposition behavior.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section we
precisely describe the framework. In section 3 we analyze the ex-post behav-
ior of a prospect theory investor and then we consider the ex-ante point of
view. In the last two sections we offer further discussion of our results and
conclude.
2 The Model
We present a two period model for portfolio choice in a stylized finan-
cial market with two assets where the investor’s preferences are described by
prospect theory as suggested by Kahneman and Tversky (1979) and Tver-
sky and Kahneman (1992). After describing the financial market and the
agent’s preferences, we derive the investor’s maximization problem and the
conditions under which the disposition effect arises.
In our framework, there is a financial market on which two assets are
traded. A riskless asset, also called the bond, and a risky asset, the stock.
The evolution of the stock prices is described by a binomial process, so that
at the end of the following period there are two possible states. If the stock
price rises, we call the corresponding state the up-state; the other state is
called the down state. In the up state, which realizes with probability p, the
risky investment yields a gross return RU . Note that 0 < p < 1. In the
down state, arising with probability 1 − p, it yields RD. The risk-free bond
yields a sure gross return of Rf . We assume that the time value of money
is positive, i.e. that interest rates are non-negative. Absence of arbitrage
requires that RU > Rf > RD. For simplicity and without loss of generality
we assume further that RD < 1. To prevent negative stock prices we assume
RD ≥ 0. These assumptions about the financial market are summarized in
the following inequality: RU > Rf ≥ 1 > RD ≥ 0. All the parameters are
assumed to be constant over time.
The preferences of the investor are based on changes in wealth and de-
scribed by prospect theory. We assume that he owns an initial endowment,
W0, and that he earns no other income. Since we want to model a small
individual investor, we assume that no short selling is allowed. Further we
assume that the investor acts myopically 3 and that the reference point rel-
3We think that assuming a myopic behavior for a small individual investor is appropri-
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ative to which he measures his gains and losses is his initial wealth. 4
The overall value of a prospect is given by the sum of the subjective values
of the outcomes weighted by the agent’s decision weights associated with the
probability of the outcome. The overall value of a prospect yielding a gain x
with probability p and a loss y with probability 1−p is given by : V (x, p; y, 1−
p) = w(p)v(x) + w(1 − p)v(y); where x ≥ 0 ≥ y. The decision weights w
measure the impact of events on the desirability of prospects. Following
Tversky and Kahneman (1992) the decision weights take the following form
w(p) =
pγ
(pγ + (1− p)γ)
1
γ
, for some 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1. (1)
The value function v assigns to each outcome x, edited as a gain or
a loss, a number v(x) which reflects the subjective value of that outcome.
As a possible form of the value function Tversky and Kahneman (1992)
proposed a two part power function. This function describes the experimental
evidence the authors found. The key features of their theory are the coding
of outcomes into gains and losses, that a loss hurts more than an equivalent
gain and asymmetric risk-taking behavior
v(x) =
{
(x)α if x ≥ 0
−β(−x)α if x < 0
.
The function v assigns to each outcome x, edited as gain or a loss, a num-
ber v(x) which reflects the subjective value of that outcome. The parameter
β is the coefficient of loss aversion and reflects the fact that losses hurt more
than equivalent gains, which is true for all β > 1. Using data from their
experiments the authors estimated β to be equal to 2.25. The coefficient α
measures the agent’s risk aversion and takes on values between zero and one.
Using data from their experiments the authors estimated α to be equal to
0.88. Observe that in the domain of gains, i.e. x ≥ 0, the value function is
concave, implying that the agent is risk averse, whereas for the domain of
losses the function is convex, i.e. the investor is risk-seeking in this domain.
We assume that all parameters are constant over time.
In the first period the investor’s portfolio decision consists of allocating
his initial wealth to one of the two assets traded in the financial market. He
ate for a descriptive model.
4Given the assumption that all the parameters are constant over time, an investor who
measures his gains and losses relative to the last period’s wealth faces in each period the
same decision problem and hence makes always the same choice.
S0
B0
W0
SU =S0RU
BU =B0Rf
WU =W0 [ λ0RU+(1-λ0)Rf ] 
SD =S0RD
BD =B0Rf
WD =W0 [ λ0RD+(1-λ0)Rf ] 
p
1-p
Figure 1: Binomial tree for the first period.
maximizes his utility in t = 0 by allocating a fraction λ0 of his initial wealth
in the risky asset and 1 − λ0 in the riskless asset. For simplicity we restrict
the fraction of wealth invested in the risky asset to be either zero or one. 5
The situation he is confronted with at time zero is depicted in Figure 1.
In t = 0 the stock is worth S0, the bond B0 and the investor owns his
initial wealth W0. With probability p the stock price goes up and the good
state realizes. In this case the stock is worth SU = S0RU , the bond price is
worth BU = B0Rf and the investors wealth is WU . Note that we skip the
time index in t = 1 and index variables simply by the unambiguous short
cut U , for the up state in t = 1, and D for the down state in t = 1. The
investor’s wealth position in the up state equals his initial wealth multiplied
by the portfolio return, where λ0 is the fraction of wealth invested in the risky
asset. Under the above assumption WU always exceeds the initial wealth,
except for the trivial case where the risk-free rate is zero and the agent does
not invest in the risky asset. Therefore the investor experiences a gain in the
good state following either investment strategy.
The bad state realizes with probability 1 − p and the stock price depre-
ciates. In this case it is worth SD = S0RD. The riskless bond yields the
certain gross return of Rf and the agent’s wealth position is WD. Given the
setting, the wealth in the down state can be greater, equal or smaller than
the initial position. The performance depends on the returns offered by the
5A possible interpretation is that the risky asset is a project that absorbs all the agent’s
wealth. If the agent decides not to invest in the project he simply keeps his wealth in a
risk-free bank account.
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traded securities and the portfolio choice of the investor. In the case where
λ = 0 and as long as interest rates are positive, the agent makes a sure gain
on his portfolio, implying that his wealth is bigger than his initial wealth,
even in the bad state. Conversely if he invests all his wealth in the risky
asset he will experience a loss in his wealth in the down state.
This yields the following maximization problem
maxλ0∈{0,1} w(p)v
(
W0(RUλ0 + Rf (1− λ0)− 1)
)
+ w(1− p)v
(
W0(RDλ0 + Rf (1− λ0)− 1)
)
,
where v(x) =
{
(x)α if x ≥ 0
−β(−x)α if x < 0
and w(p) =
pγ
(pγ + (1− p)γ)
1
γ
.
(2)
When in t = 0 the expected utility from holding the risky asset exceeds
the utility from investing in the risk free bond the agent will invest in stock.
If this conditions is not satisfied, the agent prefers to invest his entire wealth
in the risk-free bond, i.e. λ0 = 0. Hence he invests his entire wealth in the
risky asset whenever
w(p)(RU − 1)
α − w(1− p)β(1−RD)
α > (Rf − 1)
α. (3)
As we assume that in our model all the parameters are constant over
time, the setting in the second period has the same structure as in the first
period. After the investor has made his first period investment decision the
state of nature in t = 1 realizes. The market parameters, the investment
decision λ0 and the realized state of nature determine the agent’s wealth in
t = 1. In the second period the investor allocates his first period wealth to
the two assets traded in the financial market. The situation he is confronted
with is shown in Figure 2.
We will continue to skip time indices and to label the nodes of the binomial
tree with the short cuts 0, U,D, UU, UD,DU , and DD where 0, U,D are as
in the first period, UU stands for the node after two up movements, UD for
an up movement followed by a down movement, DU for a down movement
followed by an up movement and DD for two consecutive down movements.
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W0
WU
WUU =WU [ λURU+(1-λU)Rf ] 
WUD =WU [ λURD+(1-λU)Rf ] 
WD
WDU =WD [ λDRU+(1-λD)Rf ] 
WDD =WD [ λDRD+(1-λD)Rf ] 
p
p
p
1-p
1-p
1-p
Figure 2: Binomial tree for two periods.
In the same sense we will call λ0 the fraction of wealth invested in the risky
asset in t = 0, λU is the fraction of wealth invested in the risky asset in t = 1,
given the stock went up in the first period and λD is the fraction of wealth
invested in the risky asset in t = 1, given the stock went down in the first
period. The asset prices in t = 2 are standard. The investors wealth position
in t = 2 equals his position in t = 1 multiplied by the return of his portfolio
in the second period.
The maximization problem for the second period writes
maxλt∈{0,1} w(p)v
(
Wt(RUλt + Rf (1− λt))−W0
)
+ w(1− p)v
(
Wt(RDλt + Rf (1− λt))−W0
)
,
where v(x) =
{
(x)α if x ≥ 0
−β(−x)α if x < 0
,
w(p) =
pγ
(pγ + (1− p)γ)
1
γ
,
and t = {U,D}.
(4)
In t = 1 we have to distinguish different cases, which imply different
possible portfolio performances, in terms of gains and losses, and therefore
different valuations.
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In the first case, where RURD > 1 and RfRD > 1
6, the agent, who
invests in t = U his entire wealth in the risky asset, experiences a gain in
both states and he makes a sure gain, if he invests in the riskless bond. If
the down state realized in the first period, the investor who bought the risky
asset may make a gain, if after the bad state the good state realizes, or a
loss, after the realization of two consecutive down states. If he chooses to
put his wealth in the risk-free alternative, he makes a sure gain.
In the second case, where RURD > 1 and RfRD < 1, the investor who in
t = U invests his entire wealth in the risky asset, experiences a gain in both
states and he makes a sure gain, if he invests in the riskless bond. If the
down state realizes in the first period and the investor invests in the risky
asset, he experiences a gain and a loss. If the investor chooses to put all his
wealth in the risk-free alternative, he makes a sure loss.
In the third case, where RURD < 1 and RfRD < 1, the investor, who
buys the risky asset in t = U , may make a gain, if after the up state the good
state realizes, or a loss, if after the up state the down state realizes. He makes
a sure gain, when investing in the risk-free bond. If the down state realizes
and the agent invests in the risky asset, he experiences a loss independent of
which state realizes in the second period. If the investor chooses to put all
his wealth in the risk-free alternative, he makes a sure loss.
In the first two cases, i.e. when RURD > 1 and RfRD > 1 and when
RURD > 1 and RfRD < 1, the condition that the agent invests in the risky
asset after the stock price appreciated in the first period is
w(p)(RURU − 1)
α + w(1− p)(RURD − 1)
α > (RURf − 1)
α. (5)
In the third case, where RURD < 1 and RfRD < 1 the agent prefers the
risky asset to the risk-free bond whenever
w(p)(RURU − 1)
α − w(1− p)β(1−RURD)
α > (RURf − 1)
α. (6)
Similarly, the condition that the agent invests in the risky asset after the
stock price depreciated in the case where RURD > 1 and RfRD > 1 is
w(p)(RURD − 1)
α − w(1− p)β(1−RDRD)
α > (RfRD − 1)
α, (7)
in the case where RURD > 1 and RfRD < 1 we get
w(p)(RURD − 1)
α − w(1− p)β(1−RDRD)
α > −β(1−RfRD)
α (8)
6Note that it follows that RURU > 1, RURf > 1 and that RDRD < 1.
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and in the case where RURD < 1 and RfRD < 1 we get
w(p)(1−RURD)
α + w(1− p)β(1−RDRD)
α < (1−RfRD)
α. (9)
In the described setting the disposition effect is the situation, where the
agent invests in the risky asset in t = 0, sells the asset after the price appre-
ciated and keeps on holding the risky stock after its price went down. This
means that we observe the disposition effect whenever λ0 = 1, λU = 0 and
λD = 1. Thus the conditions for the disposition effect to occur are
7:
1. In the case, where RURD > 1 and RfRD > 1:
w(p)(RU − 1)
α − w(1− p)β(1−RD)
α ≥ (Rf − 1)
α,
w(p)(RURU − 1)
α + w(1− p)(RURD − 1)
α ≤ (RURf − 1)
α and
w(p)(RURD − 1)
α − w(1− p)β(1−RDRD)
α ≥ (RfRD − 1)
α.
(10)
2. In the case, where RURD > 1 and RfRD < 1:
w(p)(RU − 1)
α − w(1− p)β(1−RD)
α ≥ (Rf − 1)
α,
w(p)(RURU − 1)
α + w(1− p)(RURD − 1)
α ≤ (RURf − 1)
α and
w(p)(RURD − 1)
α − w(1− p)β(1−RDRD)
α ≥ −β(1−RfRD)
α.
(11)
3. In the case, where RURD < 1 and RfRD < 1:
w(p)(RU − 1)
α − w(1− p)β(1−RD)
α ≥ (Rf − 1)
α,
w(p)(RURU − 1)
α − w(1− p)β(1−RURD)
α ≤ (RURf − 1)
α and
w(p)(1−RURD)
α + w(1− p)(1−RDRD)
α ≤ (1−RfRD)
α.
(12)
In what follows, we investigate these conditions. First we analyze the ex-
post condition for the disposition effect, i.e. the condition that the investor
prefers simultaneously to invest in t = U in the risk-free bond and in t = D
in the stock. Then we take an ex-ante perspective and require that the agent
has to prefer the stock in t = 0, the bond in t = U and the stock in t = D.
7We assume that when the investor is indifferent between the risky and the riskless
asset, he behaves like the disposition investor, i.e. he purchases the stock in t = 0 and
t = D and he invests in the bond in t = U .
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3 Results
In this section we present the results of our model. First we discuss
the relationship between the (ex-post) disposition effect and loss aversion.
Next, we take on the traditional view, where it is implicitly assumed that
the investor already owns the risky stock and analyze his behavior given the
stock price movement. We show that in fact the ex-post disposition behavior
is consistent with most of the parameter combinations. Then we take on an
ex-ante view, and require for the disposition effect not only that the investor
sells a winning asset and keeps a loosing asset, but also that the agent decides
to buy the risky stock in t = 0. We show that the disposition effect arises
very rarely.
We first discuss the role of loss aversion: a first observation is that if the
market parameters satisfy the condition RURD > 1 and if the disposition
effect arises for a β1 > 1, then it arises for all β2, where β1 > β2 > 1. The
same statement is true for the ex-post disposition effect. The intuition is that
an investor that is less loss averse more readily buys the risky stock in t = 0
and t = D. Note that since the agent does not face a loss in t = U when
investing in the risky asset, this condition is independent of loss aversion. If
RURD < 1 and if the ex-post disposition effect arises for a β1 > 1, then it
arises for all β2, where β2 > β1. If RURD < 1 then the agent makes a loss
in t = D, independently of his investment decision, so that the investment
decision in t = D is independent of loss aversion. On the other hand, in
t = U the investor faces a gain and a loss, when buying the risky asset and
therefore he prefers more the risk-free asset the more loss averse he is. Note
that the effects of an increase in loss aversion go in opposite directions for
the conditions in t = 0 and t = U . In absolute terms the effect is stronger in
t = 0, so that if the disposition effect arises for a β1 > 1, then it arises for all
β2, where β1 > β2 > 1. Again, a lower loss aversion implies that the investor
more readily invests in the risky asset in the first period.
3.1 The Ex-post Disposition Effect
In this section we assume that the investor already owns the risky asset
and analyze his portfolio decision given a stock price movement. A possible
interpretation of this situation is that when the agent buys the risky asset
in the first period the stock is very attractive. After the first period, an
13
external shock changes the characteristics of the asset so that the investor
is faced with a liquidation decision. This liquidation decision corresponds
to the ex-post view. If the risky asset is seen as an investment project,
this liquidation decision corresponds to a situation where the agent is not
allowed to liquidate the project in the first period, during which the project’s
characteristics, i.e. the returns and the probabilities, may change. Finally it
could be the case where the project’s characteristics are not observed when
the project is initiated, but they are observed some time later.
The investment decision as described above depends on the parameters of
the agent’s preferences, α, β and γ, as well as the parameters of the financial
market, i.e. the possible returns and the probabilities for the possible states.
Since many different parameters are involved, we look first at different special
cases in order to isolate the different effects of the parameters. As we have
seen above, a lower loss aversion coefficient β favors the occurrence of the
ex-post disposition effect whenever RURD > 1 and it lowers it in the opposite
case. In this section we focus on the impacts of the parameter of the decision
weighting function γ and the coefficient of risk aversion α. We assume that
the investor is loss averse.
To get more insights, we vary the two parameters in the following way:
the parameter of the decision weighting function γ is either fixed at 1, so
that the investor weights the outcomes with the objective probabilities or it
is assumed to be between 0 and 1. When the coefficient of risk aversion α
is fixed, it is kept constant either at 0, implying that the investor is quite
risk-averse in the domain of gains and quite risk-seeking in the domain of
losses, or at 1, where the agent is risk neutral. Otherwise it is assumed to
be between 0 and 1. This yields six possible situations. The more restriction
we impose on the preference parameters, the more tractable the inequalities
describing the agents choices become. Allowing for more general parameter
ranges often has the negative consequence that no analytical statements can
be made, so that we have to provide numerical solutions.
Proposition 1 summarizes the results for the cases, where analytical state-
ments can be made. The detailed proofs can be found in the appendix.
Proposition 1. The ex-post disposition effect
1. An investor who weights outcomes with their objective probabilities and
is quite risk averse in the domain of gains and quite risk-seeking in
the domain of losses, i.e. γ = 1 and α = 0, is prone to the ex-post
disposition effect whenever RfRD < 1.
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2. A risk neutral investor, who weights outcomes with their objective prob-
abilities, i.e. γ = 1 and α = 1, is prone to the ex-post disposition effect
whenever RURD < 1 and φ4 ≥ p ≥ φ1, where φ4 =
RURf−1+β(1−RURD)
RURU−1+β(1−RURD)
and φ1 =
Rf−RD
RU−RD
.
3. An investor who weights outcomes with the decision weights as proposed
by Tversky and Kahneman (1992) and is who quite risk averse in the
domain of gains and quite risk-seeking in the domain of losses, i.e.
0 < γ < 1 and α = 0, is prone to the ex-post disposition effect whenever
RfRD < 1.
An investor who weighs outcomes with the objective probability and is
quite risk averse in the domain of gains and quite risk-seeking in the domain
of losses, i.e. γ = 1 and α = 0, is prone to the ex-post disposition effect
whenever RfRD < 1. The reason is that in t = U the agent is in the gain
zone and hence quite risk averse so that he never prefers the risky stock.
Further, if RfRD > 1 the investor has the opportunity to realize a sure gain
in t = D and therefore prefers to invest in the risk free bond. However, if
RfRD < 1, the investor is in the loss zone and is therefore quite risk-seeking,
investing therefore in the risky asset. If he can undo the first period loss, i.e.
if RURD > 1, this behavior is consistent with the break even effect. Note
that this is true even when the investor is not loss averse.
In absence of arbitrage, the risk neutral investor who weights the out-
comes with their objective probabilities is prone to the ex-post disposition
effect whenever after a first period loss, the agent cannot undo this loss, i.e.
RURD < 1 and hence RfRD < 1 and the probability of the occurrence of the
good state is bounded by φ4 from above and by φ1 from below. This is the
situation where the stock has a very high downside risk. We emphasize that
even for a risk neutral agent the ex-post disposition effect arises. However
only for restricted parameter values.
An investor who weights outcomes with the decision weights as proposed
by Tversky and Kahneman (1992) and who is quite risk averse in the domain
of gains and quite risk-seeking in the domain of losses, i.e. 0 < γ < 1 and
α = 0, is prone to the ex-post disposition effect whenever RfRD < 1. The
reason is that in t = U the quite risk averse investor never prefers the stock.
Further, if RfRD > 1 the investor has the opportunity to realize a sure gain
in t = D and prefers therefore to invest in the risk free bond. However, if
RfRD < 1, the investor is in the loss zone and is therefore quite risk-seeking,
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investing therefore in the risky asset. Note that this result is the same as in
the situation where γ = 1.
For the other combinations of α and γ no unambiguous conclusions can
be drawn. Therefore we provide a numerical analysis.
To illustrate the situation where γ = 1 and 0 < α < 1 we present Figure
3. It shows the parameter combinations for which the ex-post disposition ef-
fect arises for different returns of the risky asset, RD and RU . In the following
graphics the value of the gross risk free rate, Rf , is kept constant at 1.1 and
and the probability of the occurrence of the up-state, p is fixed at 0.5. The
values of RD vary between 0 and 1 and the RU is varied between 1.1 and 2.1.
For other values of p and Rf similar results are obtained. The loss aversion
coefficient β is kept constant at 2.25 and the coefficient for risk aversion α
equals 0.88. The parameter of the decision weights γ is fixed at 1. These val-
ues correspond to the empirical findings of Tversky and Kahneman (1992).8
The parameter combinations, where the ex-post disposition effect occurs, are
marked with black color, whereas the domains, where the conditions for the
ex-post disposition effect are violated, are marked with grey color. In Figure
3 we see that the ex-post disposition effect occurs rarely, in about 12% of
the cases (see Table 1 below). We observe it for moderate and low returns
in the down state and high returns in the up-state. We can conclude that
the ex-post disposition behavior for an agent that is described with parame-
ters consistent with empirical findings of Tversky and Kahneman (1992) and
γ = 1 is a special case and does not occur in general.
To illustrate the situation where 0 < γ < 1 and α = 1 we present Figure
4. It shows the parameter combinations for which the ex-post disposition
effect arises for different returns of the risky asset, RD and RU . Except for
α and γ the same parameter values as above are used. The parameter com-
binations, where the ex-post disposition effect occurs are marked with black
color, whereas the domains, where the conditions for the ex-post disposition
effect are violated are marked with grey color. In Figure 4 we see that the
ex-post disposition effect occurs often, in about 50% of the cases (see Table
1 below). We observe it for moderate and low returns in the down state.
We can conclude that the ex-post disposition behavior for an agent that is
described with parameters consistent with empirical findings of Tversky and
Kahneman (1992) and α = 1 does occur in general for risky assets with a
high downside risk.
8Again, for other parameter values similar results are obtained.
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Figure 3: Return combinations for which the ex-post disposition effect arises.
The values of RD vary between 0 and 1 and RU is varied between 1.1 and
2.1. The value of the gross risk free rate, Rf , is kept constant at 1.1 and
the probability of the occurrence of the up-state, p is fixed at 0.5. The loss
aversion coefficient β is kept constant at 2.25 and the coefficient for risk
aversion α equals 0.88. The parameter of the decision weights γ is fixed at
1. The parameter combinations, where the ex-post disposition effect occurs
are marked with black color. The ex-post disposition effect occurs in about
12% of the cases.
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Figure 4: Return combinations for which the ex-post disposition effect arises.
The values of RD vary between 0 and 1 and RU is varied between 1.1 and
2.1. The value of the gross risk free rate, Rf , is kept constant at 1.1 and
the probability of the occurrence of the up-state, p is fixed at 0.5. The
loss aversion coefficient β is kept constant at 2.25 and the coefficient of risk
aversion α equals 1. The parameter of the decision weights γ is fixed at 0.65.
The parameter combinations, where the ex-post disposition effect occurs are
marked with black color. The ex-post disposition effect occurs in about 50%
of the cases.
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To illustrate the most general case, i.e. the situation where 0 < γ < 1
and 0 < α < 1, we present Figure 5. It shows the parameter combinations
for which the ex-post disposition effect arises for different returns of the risky
asset, RD and RU . Except for α and γ the same parameter values as above
are used. These values correspond to the empirical findings of Tversky and
Kahneman (1992)9 The parameter combinations, where the ex-post disposi-
tion effect occurs are marked with black color, whereas the domains, where
the conditions for the ex-post disposition effect are violated are marked with
grey color. In Figure 5 we see that the ex-post disposition effect occurs often,
in about 59% of the cases. We observe it for moderate and low returns in the
down state. We can conclude that the ex-post disposition behavior for an
agent that is described with parameters consistent with empirical findings of
Tversky and Kahneman (1992) does occur in general for risky assets with a
high downside risk.
3.2 The True Disposition Effect
In this section we make one step backward in time and impose the additional
condition that besides selling a winning stock and keeping a losing stock the
investor has bought the stock in the first place. So that the disposition effect
arises whenever the requirements to simultaneously prefer the stock in t = 0
and t = D and to prefer the bond in t = D are satisfied. This makes the
definition of the disposition effect more consistent. Since the conditions for
the disposition effect in t = 1 stay the same as for the ex-post disposition
effect, in this section we focus on the ex-ante conditions.
The investment decision as described above depends on the parameters of
the agent’s preferences, α, β and γ, as well as the parameters of the financial
market, i.e. the possible returns and the probabilities for the possible states.
Since many different parameters are involved, we first look at different special
cases in order to isolate the different effects of the parameters. As we have
seen above, a lower loss aversion coefficient β favors the occurrence of the
disposition effect. In this section we focus on the impacts of the parameter
of the decision weighting function γ and the coefficient of risk aversion α.
We assume that the investor is loss averse.
9Tversky and Kahneman have estimated the value of γ to be 0.61 if gains are involved
and 0.69 when losses are involved. For simplicity we take the same value for gains and
losses and set γ = 0.65. Again, for other parameter values similar results are obtained.
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Figure 5: Return combinations for which the ex-post disposition effect arises.
The values of RD vary between 0 and 1 and the RU is varied between 1.1
and 2.1. The value of the gross risk free rate, Rf , is kept constant at 1.1
and the probability of the occurrence of the up-state, p is fixed at 0.5. The
loss aversion coefficient β is kept constant at 2.25 and the coefficient for risk
aversion α equals 0.88. The parameter of the decision weights γ is fixed
at 0.65. The parameter combinations, where the ex-post disposition effect
occurs are marked with black color. The ex-post disposition effect occurs in
about 59% of the cases.
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To get more insights, we vary the two parameters in the following way:
the parameter of the decision weighting function γ is either fixed at 1, so
that the investor weights the outcomes with the objective probabilities or it
is assumed to be between 0 and 1. When the coefficient of risk aversion α
is fixed, it is kept constant either at 0, implying that the investor is quite
risk averse in the domain of gains and quite risk-seeking in the domain of
losses, or at 1, where the agent is risk neutral. Otherwise it is assumed to
be between 0 and 1. This yields six possible situations. The more restriction
we impose on the preference parameters, the more tractable the inequalities
describing the agents choices become. Allowing for more general parameter
ranges often has the negative consequence that no analytical statements can
be made, so that we have to provide numerical solutions.
Proposition 2 summarizes the results for the cases where analytical state-
ments can be made. The detailed proofs can be found in the appendix.
Proposition 2. The true disposition effect
1. An investor who weights outcomes with their objective probabilities and
is quite risk averse in the domain of gains and quite risk-seeking in
the domain of losses, i.e. γ = 1 and α = 0, never is prone to the
disposition effect.
2. A risk neutral investor, who weights outcomes with their objective prob-
abilities, i.e. γ = 1 and α = 1, is never prone to the disposition effect.
3. An investor who weights outcomes with the decision weights as proposed
by Tversky and Kahneman (1992) and is who quite risk averse in the
domain of gains and quite risk-seeking in the domain of losses, i.e.
0 < γ < 1 and α = 0, never is prone to the disposition effect.
An investor who weights outcomes with their objective probabilities and
who is quite risk averse in the domain of gains and quite risk-seeking in the
domain of losses, never invests in the risky asset in t = 0 implying that he
cannot be prone to the disposition effect.
A risk neutral investor, who weights outcomes with their objective prob-
abilities never is prone to the disposition effect because he either does not
prefer the stock in t = 0 or , if he invests in the risky asset in the first period,
after a gain, he will prefer to hold the stock in the second period.
An investor who weights outcomes with the decision weights as proposed
by Tversky and Kahneman (1992) and who is quite risk averse in the domain
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of gains and quite risk-seeking in the domain of losses, never invests in the
risky asset in t = 0 implying that he is not prone to the disposition effect.
For the other combinations of α and γ no unambiguous conclusions can
be drawn. Therefore we provide a numerical analysis.
To illustrate the situation where γ = 1 and 0 < α < 1 we present Figure
6. It shows the parameter combinations for which the disposition effect
arises for different returns of the risky asset, RD and RU . In the following
graphics the value of the gross risk free rate, Rf , is kept constant at 1.1
and and the probability of the occurrence of the up-state, p is fixed at 0.5.
The values of RD vary between 0 and 1 and the RU is varied between 1.1
and 2.1. For other values of p and Rf similar results are obtained. The
loss aversion coefficient β is kept constant at 2.25 and the coefficient for risk
aversion α equals 0.88. The parameter of the decision weights γ is fixed at 1.
These values correspond to the empirical findings of Tversky and Kahneman
(1992). 10 The parameter combinations, where the disposition effect occurs
are marked with black color, whereas the domains, where the conditions for
the disposition effect are violated are marked with grey color. In Figure 6 we
see that the disposition effect almost never occurs, in fact overall it occurs
in less than 0.5% of the cases (see Table 1 below ).
To illustrate the situation where 0 < γ < 1 and α = 1 we present Figure 7.
It shows the parameter combinations for which the disposition effect arises for
different returns of the risky asset, RD and RU . Except for α and γ the same
parameter values as above are used. The parameter combinations, where the
disposition effect occurs are marked with black color, whereas the domains,
where the conditions for the disposition effect are violated are marked with
grey color. In Figure 7 we see that the disposition effect occurs very rarely,
in less than 0.5% of the cases. We observe it for very high returns in the
down state and returns in the up-state of the order 1.3. We can conclude
that the disposition behavior for an agent that is described with parameters
consistent with the empirical findings of Tversky and Kahneman (1992) and
α = 1 is a very special case and does not occur in general.
To illustrate the general case, i.e the situation where 0 < γ < 1 and
0 < α < 1, we present Figure 8. It shows the parameter combinations for
which the disposition effect arises for different returns of the risky asset,
RD and RU . Except for α and γ the same parameter values as above are
used. The parameter combinations, where the disposition effect occurs are
10Again, for other parameter values similar results are obtained.
22
1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8 20
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
RU
R
D
Figure 6: Parameter combinations for which the disposition effect arises for
different returns of the risky asset, RD and RU . The values of RD vary be-
tween 0 and 1 and the RU is varied between 1.1 and 2.1. The value of the
gross risk free rate, Rf , is kept constant at 1.1 and the probability of the
occurrence of the up-state, p is fixed at 0.5. The loss aversion coefficient β is
kept constant at 2.25 and the coefficient for risk aversion α equals 0.88. The
parameter of the decision weights γ is fixed at 1. The parameter combina-
tions, where the disposition effect occurs are marked with black color. The
disposition effect occurs in less than 0.5% of the cases.
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Figure 7: Parameter combinations for which the disposition effect arises for
different returns of the risky asset, RD and RU . The values of RD vary
between 0 and 1 and the RU is varied between 1.1 and 2.1. The value of
the gross risk free rate, Rf , is kept constant at 1.1 and the probability of
the occurrence of the up-state, p is fixed at 0.5. The loss aversion coefficient
β is kept constant at 2.25 and the coefficient for risk aversion α equals 1.
The parameter of the decision weights γ is fixed at 0.65. The parameter
combinations, where the disposition effect occurs are marked with black color.
The disposition effect occurs in less than 0.5% of the cases.
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Figure 8: Parameter combinations for which the disposition effect arises for
different returns of the risky asset, RD and RU . The values of RD vary
between 0 and 1 and the RU is varied between 1.1 and 2.1. The value of the
gross risk free rate, Rf , is kept constant at 1.1 and the probability of the
occurrence of the up-state, p is fixed at 0.5. The loss aversion coefficient β
is kept constant at 2.25 and the coefficient for risk aversion α equals 0.88.
The parameter of the decision weights γ is fixed at 0.65. The parameter
combinations, where the disposition effect occurs are marked with black color.
The disposition effect occurs in less than 0.5% of the cases.
marked with black color, whereas the domains, where the conditions for the
disposition effect are violated are marked with grey color. In Figure 8 we see
that the disposition effect occurs very rarely, in less than 0.5% of the cases.
We observe it for very high returns in the down state and returns in the
up-state of the order 1.3. We can conclude that the disposition behavior for
an agent that is described with parameters consistent with empirical findings
of Tversky and Kahneman (1992) is a very special case and does not occur
in general.
To gain more insight on the different drivers of the disposition effect we
present Figure 9, where we take a preference oriented view. We present the
cases where the disposition effect in the general case occurs in dependence
of risk aversion α and loss aversion β; α ranges from 0 to 1 and β from
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Figure 9: Parameter combinations for which the disposition effect arises in
dependence of risk aversion α and loss aversion β; α ranges from 0 to 1 and β
from 1 to 5. The market parameters are fixed for the case where we observed
the disposition effect, i.e. p = 0.5, RU = 1.32, Rf = 1.1, RD = 0.99 and
γ = 0.65.
1 to 5. The market parameters are fixed for the case where we observed
the disposition effect, i.e. p = 0.5, RU = 1.32, Rf = 1.1, RD = 0.99 and
γ = 0.65. Again we observe that the disposition effect occurs only for a very
small part of the possible parameters and cannot be considered a systematic
phenomenon.
4 Discussion
We have shown that the disposition effect arises rather for lower coefficients
of loss aversion , i.e. lower β and that if RURD > 1 the same is true for
the ex-post disposition effect. If however, RURD < 1, i.e. whenever the
agent cannot undo the first period loss by investing in the risk free bond, the
ex-post disposition effect arises rather for more loss averse investors.
Concerning the impact of α and γ on the ex-post disposition effect we
found the following results. An investor who weights outcomes with the
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objective probability and is quite risk averse in the domain of gains and
quite risk-seeking in the domain of losses, i.e. γ = 1 and α = 0, is prone
to the ex-post disposition effect whenever RfRD < 1. The reason is that
in t = U the agent is in the gain zone and hence quite risk averse so that
he never prefers the risky stock. Further, if RfRD > 1 the investor has the
opportunity to realize a sure gain in t = D and therefore prefers to invest in
the risk free bond. However, if RfRD < 1, the investor is in the loss zone
and consequently he is quite risk seeking and hence he buys the risky asset.
If he can undo the first period loss, i.e. if RURD > 1, the respective behavior
is called get-even-itis. Note that this is true even when the investor is not
loss averse. In absence of arbitrage, the risk neutral investor who weights the
outcomes with their objective probabilities is prone to the ex-post disposition
effect whenever after a first period loss the agent cannot undo this loss, i.e.
RURD < 1 and hence RfRD < 1, and the probability of the occurrence of the
good state is bounded by φ4 from above and by φ1 from bellow. This is the
situation where the stock has a very high downside risk. We emphasize that
even for a risk neutral agent the ex-post disposition effect arises, however only
for restricted parameter values. We found that for the investor who weights
outcomes with the objective probability and is characterized by 0 < α < 1,
the ex-post disposition effect occurs rarely, i.e. in about 12% of the cases
(see Table 1 below). We observe it for moderate and low returns in the down
state and high returns in the up-state. An investor who weights outcomes
with the decision weights as proposed by Tversky and Kahneman (1992) and
who is quite risk averse in the domain of gains and quite risk-seeking in the
domain of losses, i.e. 0 < γ < 1 and α = 0, is prone to the ex-post disposition
effect whenever RfRD < 1. The reason is that in t = U the quite risk averse
investor never prefers the stock. Further, if RfRD > 1 the investor has the
opportunity to realize a sure gain in t = D and therefore prefers to invest in
the risk free bond. However, if RfRD < 1 the investor is in the loss zone and
is there for quite risk-seeking, investing therefore in the risky asset. Note
that this result is the same as in the situation where γ = 1. For the investor
characterized by 0 < γ < 1 and α = 1 we present numerical solutions.
We observe the ex-post disposition effect for moderate and low returns in
the down state, in about 50% of the cases. For the investor characterized
by 0 < γ < 1 and 0 < α < 1 we observe the ex-post disposition effect
for moderate and low returns in the down state in about 59% of the cases.
We can conclude that the ex-post disposition behavior for an agent that is
described with parameters consistent with empirical findings of Tversky and
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Kahneman (1992) does in general occur for risky assets with a high downside
risk.
The impacts of α and γ on the occurrence of the disposition effect are
summarized in the following paragraph. An investor who weights outcomes
with their objective probabilities and is quite risk averse in the domain of
gains and quite risk-seeking in the domain of losses, never invests in the risky
asset in t = 0 implying that he cannot be prone to the disposition effect. A
risk neutral investor, who weights outcomes with their objective probabilities
also never is prone to the disposition effect because he either does not prefer
the stock in t = 0 or , if he invests in the risky asset in the first period, after
a gain, he will prefer to hold the stock in the second period. For the investor
characterized by γ = 1 and 0 < α < 1 we observe that the disposition effect
never occurs. An investor who weights outcomes with the decision weights
as proposed by Tversky and Kahneman (1992) and who is quite risk averse
in the domain of gains and quie risk-seeking in the domain of losses never
invests in the risky asset in t = 0 implying that he is not prone to the
disposition effect. For the investor characterized by 0 < γ < 1 and α = 1 we
observe that the disposition effect occurs very rarely, i.e in less than 0.5% of
the cases (see Table 1 below). For the investor characterized by 0 < γ < 1
and 0 < α < 1, we also observe that the disposition effect occurs very rarely,
so that we can conclude that the disposition behavior for an agent that is
described with parameters consistent with empirical findings of Tversky and
Kahneman (1992) is a very special case and does not occur in general.
We summarize these results in Table 1. We quantify the occurrence of
the (ex-post) disposition effect for the following parameter values: p = 0.5,
RU ∈ [1.1, 2.1] Rf = 1.1 and RD ∈ [0, 1]. If no other parameter values are
assumed, then α = 0.88, β = 2.25, and γ = 0.65.
The agent being quite risk averse in the domain of gains and quite risk-
seeking in the domain of losses is prone to the ex-post disposition effect
whenever he cannot undo his first period loss by investing in the risk free
bond. This result is very intuitive and is independent of the value of γ.
However, this investor, because he is quite risk avers in the domain of gains
and has the possibility to make a sure gain in t = 0 never invests in the risky
asset, indecently of his loss aversion. From this it follows that he cannot be
prone to the disposition effect.
The risk neutral investor, who weights outcomes with their objective prob-
abilities, although being prone to the ex-post disposition effect when being
in the loss zone, is never prone to the disposition effect. The reason is that
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Disposition Effect Ex-Post Disposition Effect
γ = 1, α = 0 Never If RfRD < 1, (90%)
γ = 1, α = 1 Never If RURD < 1, (6%)
γ = 1, 0 < α < 1 < 0.5% 13%
0 < γ < 1, α = 0 Never If RfRD < 1, (90%)
0 < γ < 1, α = 1 < 0.5% 50%
0 < γ < 1, 0 < α < 1 < 0.5% 59%
Table 1: Summary of Results. We quantify the occurrence of the (ex-post)
disposition effect for the following parameter values: p = 0.5, RU ∈ [1.1, 2.1]
Rf = 1.1 and RD ∈ [0, 1]. If no other parameter values are assumed, then
α = 0.88, β = 2.25, and γ = 0.65.
he either does not prefer the stock in t = 0 or , if he invests in the risky asset
in the first period, after a gain, he will prefer to hold the stock in the second
period. Note that this statement does not hold for an agent that is not loss
averse.
For the other investors, we observe very similar results: they are generally
prone to the ex-post disposition effect, but hardly to the ex-ante disposition
effect, independently from the parameter values of γ and α. These results are
confirmed in Figure 9, where we take a preference parameter oriented view
and observe that the disposition effect occurs only in very restricted areas of
the α-β room.
Other numerical analyses, we do not show here, confirm that the ex-
post conditions are satisfied more often than conditions for the disposition
effect and that the differences can be quite substantial. Further, the ex-
post disposition effect occurs more often for low γ, i.e. the stronger the
departure from the weighting by objective probabilities is. The conditions
to sell a winning stock is satisfied more often for lower β, since a lower loss
aversion implies higher risk-taking in the first period and because in t = U
the decision often is independent of loss aversion. We find no systematic
influence of γ and α on this ex-ante condition. The condition to keep on
holding a losing stock is in general more often satisfied for attractive stocks,
i.e. when the probability of the up-state is high and the risky stock offers
high returns. Further it is satisfied more often for low loss and risk aversion.
29
The condition is more often satisfied for higher values of γ. This shows that
the effects of the different variables work often in different directions in the
divers conditions that have to be satisfied simultaneously.
Similar results are obtained for other forms of value functions, as e.g.
the piece-wise exponential function. For preference parameter values that
approximate best the empirical evidence found by Tversky and Kahneman11
and market parameter parameters as used above, we found that the ex-post
disposition effect occurs in 59% of the cases, whereas the true disposition
effect occurs in less than 0.5%. Note that if the investor did decide his
investment decision with a fair coin then we would observe the ex-post dis-
position effect in 25% of the cases, while the true disposition effect would
occur in 12.5% of the cases. Hence comparing to this benchmark, our re-
sults shows a tendency for the ex-post disposition effect but against the true
disposition effect.
Moreover, introducing editing rules of prospect theory, as e.g. segrega-
tion, does not change the results substantially. For the parameter values used
above, we found that the ex-post disposition effect occurs in 65% of the cases
and the true disposition effect in less than 0.5%. Finally, requiring dynamic
instead of myopic optimization makes the risky asset more attractive in the
first period because one anticipates to optimally react to the future course
of events. However, whenever the agent prefers to invest in the risky asset
in the first period, he prefers to keep it after its price appreciated. In this
case the true disposition effect also occurs in less than 0.5% of the parameter
combinations.
Hence we have shown that various approaches, incorporating different
types of value functions and editing rules, have difficulties to model the dis-
position effect. This suggests that in order to explain the disposition effect
one must depart from the traditional forward looking optimization paradigm
in a more radical way than replacing the von Neumann-Morgenstern utility
function in the expected utility paradigm by the value function of prospect
theory.
A possible alternative explanation could be to model the disposition ef-
fect as a consequence of a backward looking optimization. Given the past
investment decision, the agent transforms the outcome such that he gets the
highest utility: if the investment decision is successful, the agent realizes his
11For a discussion and the concrete parameter values we refer the reader to DeGiorgi,
Hens, and Levy (2005).
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gain, i.e. he transforms the outcome to a realized gain. If he incurs a loss, he
keeps the outcome as a paper loss, i.e. he keeps holding the asset. One could
model such a behavior using two mental accounts, one for realized gains and
losses and the other for paper gains and losses. Clearly in such a model the
positions in the paper account have less weight than the ones in the realized
account: paper losses hurt less than realized losses and realized gains give
more utility than paper gains. Hence behavior consistent with the disposi-
tion effect makes the best out of a given investment decision. Note that for
this argument neither loss aversion nor asymmetric risk aversion is needed
since it is sufficient to assume that the utility of a gain is positive while that
of a loss is negative. However this behavior is not forward looking because
the resulting asset allocation may not be optimal in the future. This expla-
nation corresponds to the story told by Gross (1982), page 150: Investors
who accept losses can no longer prattle to their loved ones, ”Honey, it‘s only
a paper loss.”
5 Conclusions
In the literature the disposition effect is explained by two main features of
prospect theory, namely that decision-makers frame their choices in terms of
potential gains and losses and that they maximize an S-shaped value func-
tion, which is concave for gains and convex for losses. The argument is often
made without considering loss aversion. As we have shown, the assumption
of no loss aversion favors the occurrence of the disposition effect. However,
even for investors that are not loss averse, the disposition behavior is rather
a rare result. Further, in the standard argument, it is generally assumed that
the investor has bought the risky stock in the first place. Therefore, the issue
whether the investor really will decide in this way is neglected. This implies
that the standard argument is in fact an ex-post argument. Our model shows
that the inter-temporal disposition behavior occurs only for very restricted
parameter values. In general, the model predicts that those investors who
sell winning stocks too early and keep losing stocks too long would in the
first place not have invested in stocks. We conclude that prospect theory can
indeed explain the ex-post disposition behavior, but not the more complete
and inter-temporal definition of the disposition behavior. Possible alterna-
tive explanations for the disposition effect could include mental accounting
combined with backward looking optimization.
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A Appendix
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
1. We analyze the two conditions for t = 1 for the parameter combination
γ = 1 and α = 0. In the first case, where RfRD > 1 and the second
case, where RURD > 1 and RfRD < 1, the condition to sell the asset
after a gain yields
p + (1− p) ≤ 1, (13)
which is satisfied for all 0 < p < 1. The condition for the investor to
prefer the risky asset in t = D in the first case yields
−(1− p)β ≥ 1− p, (14)
which yields a contradiction for all β ≥ 1 and 0 < p < 1 , so that
no ex-post disposition effect occurs. In the second case the condition
yields
p ≥ −pβ, (15)
which is satisfied for all β ≥ 1 and 0 < p < 1, so that the ex-post
disposition effect does arise. In the third case, where RURD < 1 , the
condition to sell the winning stock yields
−(1− p)β ≤ 1− p, (16)
which is satisfied for all β ≥ 1 and 0 < p < 1, and to hold a loosing
stock yields
p + (1− p) ≤ 1, (17)
which is satisfied for all 0 < p < 1, so that the ex-post disposition effect
does arise.
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2. For the first case, where RfRD > 1, the ex-post condition is satisfied
whenever
φ1 ≥ p ≥ φ2
where φ1 =
Rf −RD
RU −RD
,
φ2 =
RfRD − 1 + β(1−RDRD)
RURD − 1 + β(1−RDRD)
.
(18)
In absence of arbitrage and for all β > 1 it follows that φ2 > φ1, so
that this conditions is never satisfied.12 For the case, where RURD > 1
and RfRD < 1, the ex-post disposition effect arises whenever
φ1 ≥ p ≥ φ3
where φ3 =
βRD(Rf −RD)
RURD − 1 + β(1−RDRD)
.
(19)
Note that in absence of arbitrage and for all β > 1 it follows that
φ3 > φ1, so that this condition is never satisfied. For the case, where
RURD < 1, the ex-post disposition effect arises whenever
φ4 ≥ p ≥ φ1
where φ4 =
RURf − 1 + β(1−RURD)
RURU − 1 + β(1−RURD)
.
(20)
Note that in absence of arbitrage and for all β > 1 φ3 > φ1.
3. In the first case, where RfRD > 1 the agent prefers to invest his wealth
in t = U in the risk free asset if
w(p) + w(1− p) ≤ 1, (21)
which is true for all 0 < γ < 1 and 0 < p < 1. The condition to prefer
to invest in the risky asset in t = D yields
−w(1− p)β ≥ 1− w(p), (22)
12Note that for an investor that is not loss avers, i.e. β = 1, φ2 = φ1 for all parameters,
so that the investor is prone to the ex-post disposition effect in the special case where
p = φ2 = φ1.
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which yields a contradiction for all β ≥ 1 and 0 < w(x) < 1. So that no
ex-post disposition effect occurs. In the second case, where RURD > 1
and RfRD < 1, the agent prefers to invest his wealth in t = U in the
risk free asset if
w(p) + w(1− p) ≤ 1, (23)
which is true for all 0 < γ < 1 and 0 < p < 1. The condition to prefer
to invest in the risky asset in t = D yields
w(p) ≥
(
w(1− p)− 1
)
β, (24)
which is satisfied for all β ≥ 1and 0 < w(x) < 1. So that the ex-
post disposition effect occurs in this case. In the third case, where
RURD < 1, the agent prefers to invest his wealth in t = U in the risk
free asset if
−w(1− p)β ≤ 1− w(p), (25)
which is true for all β ≥ 1 and 0 < w(x) < 1. The condition to prefer
to invest in the risky asset in t = D yields
w(p) + w(1− p) ≤ 1, (26)
which is true for all 0 < γ < 1 and 0 < p < 1. So that the investor
behaves from an ex-post perspective as a disposition investor whenever
the investor makes a sure loss investing in the risk free asset in t = D.
2
A.2 Proof of Proposition 2
1. For the parameter combination γ = 1 and α = 0 the condition to invest
in the risky asset t = 0 writes:
−(1− p)β ≥ 1− p, (27)
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which is a contradiction for all 0 < p < 1 and β ≥ 1, since the left
hand side is negative. Therefore the quite risk averse investor who
weights outcomes with their objective probability never invests in the
risky asset in t = 0 implying that he cannot be prone to the disposition
effect.
2. For the parameter combination γ = 1 and α = 1 in the first case, where
RfRD > 1, the condition that the investor buys the stock in the first
period and sells it after a gain yields
p(RU − 1)− (1− p)β(1−RD)−Rf + 1 ≥ 0,
p(RURU − 1) + (1− p)(RURD − 1)−RURf + 1 ≤ 0.
(28)
These conditions cannot be satisfied simultaneously since combining
them yields (1 − p)(β − 1)(RD − 1) ≥ 0 which is a contradiction for
all 0 < p < 1, β > 1 and RD < 1
13. For the case, where RURD > 1
and RfRD < 1 the conditions for the investor to buy the risky asset
in t = 0 and to sell it after a gain, are the same as in the case, where
RURD > 1 and RfRD > 1.
For the case, where RURD < 1 and RfRD < 1, the condition that the
investor buys the stock in the first period and sells it after a gain yields
(1− p)(β− 1) ≤ 0 which is a contradiction for all 0 < p < 1 and β > 1.
3. For the parameter combination 0 < γ < 1 and α = 0 the condition for
t = 0 writes:
−w(1− p)β ≥ 1− w(p), (29)
which is a contradiction for all 0 < w(p) < 1 and β ≥ 1. So that
the quite risk averse investor never invests in the risky asset in t = 0
implying that he is not prone to the disposition effect.
2
13Note that an investor who is not loss averse, i.e. β = 1, would buy the stock in the
first period and sell it after a gain.
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